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This paper is a defense of the past hypothesis; i.e. one possible solution to the problems 
presented by the apparently time asymmetric laws of thermodynamics. The paper begins with a 
brief account of time asymmetry in thermodynamics, Boltzmann’s theory of statistical 
mechanics, the problems surrounding said theory, and the past hypothesis (one possible solution 
to Boltzmann’s theory). 
The second law of thermodynamics, in simplistic terms, states that any irreversible 
process (e.g. melting ice or a cold hand holding a warm hand until they are the same 
temperature) results in an increase in entropy. Thus, it is not a time reversal invariant law. In 
other words, the direction of time is relevant to determining the end result of the relevant 
process.This is in stark contrast to more fundamental, microscopic laws of physics which are 
time reversal invariant. Therefore, the following question arises: where exactly does time 
reversal variance come into the equation? Boltzmann theory of statistical mechanics provides a 
microscopic account of entropy. However, Boltzmann’s account is characterized by time reversal 
invariance. Therefore, it cannot fully explain thermodynamic time asymmetry, as it cannot make 
accurate retroactive predictions. One solution to this is the introduction of a boundary condition. 
By means of the added condition that the universe began in a state of very low entropy, statistical 
mechanics is enabled to make accurate retroactive predictions. This solution is known as the past 
hypothesis. 
The first objection to the past hypothesis considered by Lee is that there is no 
independent evidence for the past hypothesis (5-6). Lee responds to this objection by appealing 
to big bang cosmology. Since contemporary cosmology posits that the universe began in a highly 
ordered, equilibristic state, cosmological evidence provides independent support of the past 
hypothesis. One might use big bang cosmology to argue that thermodynamic time asymmetry is 
located not in dynamic laws but rather in the initial state of the universe. Lee makes the astute 
observation that such a defense relies on a certain amount of faith in our records of the past (6). 
Should an objector deny such faith, there is no trustworthy independent evidence for the past 
hypothesis. Lee argues that we should trust our records of the past because to deny them would 
be to throw out all observation-based science. The problem with such an assertion is that it draws 
a false equivalence between the contemporary observations which support fundamental laws 
(e.g. Newtonian mechanics) and backward facing cosmology. Conjectures about the beginning of 
the universe should not be placed in the same epistemic category as contemporary observation. 
As long as Lee draws an equivalence between big bang cosmology and more contemporary 
 
observations, she is not being charitable to the objection. 
 
The second objection to the past hypothesis considered by Lee is “that the dynamic laws 
in statistical mechanics should be time-reversal asymmetric” (6-9). Lee’s treatment of this 
objection greatly supports her argument because the true puzzle of thermodynamic time 
asymmetry is how time reversal invariant laws on the microscopic level produce time reversal 
noninvariant laws on the macroscopic level. Lee skillfully demonstrates the ineffectiveness of 
time reversal noninvariant microscopic theories of thermodynamics by showing that even these 
theories do not eliminate the need for a boundary condition (8). Lee might have taken this 
section of her defense a step further by showing why a boundary condition alone is enough to 
explain the emergence of thermodynamic time asymmetry. Nevertheless, Lee convincingly 
argues against time reversal noninvariant microscopic theories by appeal to the remaining need 
for boundary conditions. 
While Lee’s argument is convincing, it is weakened by the absence of cited sources 
which object to the past hypothesis. Though it is clear that Lee is very knowledgeable in regards 
to the relevant topics, without citation of the objections, one cannot be certain that she is being 
charitable to the objectors. It would helpful to see the line of reasoning employed by the 
objectors themselves. As it stands, the reader is given only Lee’s version of the accounts of 
anonymous objectors. This leaves one to wonder how opponents of the past hypothesis might 
choose to support their objection. 
Lee is also very reliant upon big bang cosmology to defend the past hypothesis against 
opponents who call attention to the need for independent evidence. Should one deny the verity of 
big bang cosmology, Lee’s argument falls apart. It seems that independent evidence from more 
fundamental sciences may still be needed. 
In sum, “Statistical Mechanics and the Past Hypothesis” is a convincing defense of the 
past hypothesis which could be strengthened by the use of more sources and less dependence on 
cosmology. 
